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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE L. RANDALL, formerly BONNIE L. BRICKER,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 16230

)

)
)
)

vs.
DANNYE. BRICKER,

)

)

Defendant and
Appellant.

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE.i.'1ENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent Bonnie L.
Randall, formerly, Bonnie L. Bricker, to renew a judgment

__

based
,.,.,..,__upon - chil~.

~::-1~,2.f..1;•

that was originally entered on

February 26, 1970.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both Plaintiff-Respondent Sonnie L. Randall and
Defendant-Appellant Danny E. Bricker moved for swmnary
judgment and the lower court held that:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

______ _

The divorce court in the State of Utah did

"

-

~

-

-

-

-

-

-

~

not maintain jurisdiction over the Appellant while he was
...... -t~,:_~~X a.~-si::;:t f~_om ~~e sta~e, for the PUIP_9-se_?_!

renewing a judgment based upon child support;

---- ...

2.

. --.·--

~-,.--

...

-"--·~"~,,...._~

"'

.

Absence from the state tolls the statute of

limitations, regardless of whether the Utah court maintained
jurisdiction over the Appellant and whether service of
process could have been effected;
3.

Respondent is entitled to renew her judgment

----------··--·--·--- .... -

even though she filed her complaint to renew said judgment

-··

in excess of eight years from the date of the original
judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of summary judgment in
favor of Respondent and requests that summary judgment in
favor of Appellant be granted, or, in the alternative, seeks
a remand to the district court for trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Judgment in the amount of $2, 150. 00 was ent.~led
against the Appellant on the 26th day of February, 1970.
-- ._,.,
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based upon support

paym_:n~s

tc a prior divorce decree.
-··--- ... ..... ·--...--.
~ ......

-,_

~

(R.29,30)

,~.

purs~~I,l.t

allegedly due and owing

Appellant was not
(R.29)

On or about
... ___

~

-· - -·--

··"

June 30, 1978, (approximately eight years and four months
-:.,;-

-

.

...-~-·

- -

~-~------

after the entry of said judgment) Plaintiff-Respondent filed

------

___,

a complaint to renew

said judgment.

............~-~~--,

~ -~--

..

-. ~--

..

(R.2,3)

During the period of time between February 26,
1970, and June 30, 1978, Appellant resided in North Carolina
for a

pe~od

~~.

in exces.:._

-

Carolina, Appellant made suppo:t
~

-

--

...

-------

(R.27)

p~~ei;£_~,.

While in North
·- __..
~<?,. t;.l.le .~~4.w,t
s~r_V:l:.,<;~,_, ..Q.f,

by check that had his address where personal
---- --- ,.,~

process could be

-d..

-- . -

........ -.

.

e~~~.£.t;..ed..__p.rint;:eq __.th~n.

'

(R. 27)

On or

about the 2nd day of September, 1974, while Appellant was

------------------____......

~---

..

residing in North Carolina, Respondent did, in fact, serve
....
.~

--------~

Appellant, with an Order to Show Cause in connection with
said divorce action.

(R. 27, 31)

Respondent knew, or could have known, with little
effort, Appellant's whereabouts the entire time he resided
in North Carolina.
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ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT'S ACTIO:i HEREIN IS BARRED BY THE

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
It is uncontested that Respondent filed her compla:
to renew the judgment eight years and four months from the
date said judgment was entered.

Section 78-12-22, Utah Code

Ann., 1953, limits plaintiff's rights to bring an action

---·--·

"to enforce any liability due . . . for failure to provide
support or maintenance for dependent children," to eight
years.

The only issue is whether Respondent falls within an

exception to said statute of limitation.
Respondent's only defense to the statute of limit·
ation was her allegation that Appe_l}an_t was abs_e!lt-~.rom the
----~..-_.....-~-- ......--.--.-.>J

-----

state, which tolled the limitation.

Section 78-12-35, ~
. . . . . , _ _ ._ _ _ _

..

_ ...... d

~

..

Code Ann., 1953, states:
" . . . [I]f after a cause of action accrues
he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action."
Appellant is not denying that he was out of the
state in excess of one year, however, Ap_pellant cl§l~!;!S that
Section 78-12-35, which Respondent solely relies upon, is
not applicable in this case.
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Absence from the state does toll the statute of
limitations except under certain circumstances as outlined
in the case of Snyder '!..;_Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d
915, 916-17 (1964).

This Court held that where the Utah

court maintained jurisdiction over the defendant, the
----

•

....

··-,

• ,,,,._ - .. -._..

_...

,-'. ·---

--··· _,,._---:;..,l::i"'i--t\"';'•r:. . _, ,.

•;., .......

.

defendant's absence did not toll the statute of
limitationsJ
-p ..
-

-.

and Section 78-12-35

-·-

·-

-

.••

i;.

,.,,._...,..._..,,,• ..,..,,;,,..~

was inapplicable.
_. __ ........,._._.._.,,.._
~-

-~

l

..,.. .. ._..............-,.,

The court explained

that the objective of Section 78-12-35 was "to prevent a
defendant from depriving plaintiff of the opportunity of
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the
period of limitation."

The court then concluded:

"[Defendants] were thus not 'absent' from the state
in the sense contemplated by the statute, that
is, unavailable for the service of process.
Therefore, the plaintiff was not prevented from
commencing her action at any time she desired.
That being so, there exists no reason for tolling
the running of the statute. When the reason for
the rule is gone, the rule should vanish with it.

*

*

*

*

[I]t is our opinion that for the reasons
we have hereinabove expressed, the view which is
sounder and better considered is that followed
by the greater number of jurisdictions, that
where the plaintiff could have pursued her remedy
at any time she desired, she was obliged to commence
her action within the statute of limitations or it
is barred.
(Emphasis added)
The court reasoned that the policy considerations and legislative intent behind the statute of limitations would be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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circumvented if the limitations could be tolled indefinite['!
because of defendant's absence, when plaintiff could commence a suit and serve process at any desired time.
Snyder Y..:_ Clune, impliedly overrules Keith-O'Brien
Company Y.:_ Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954 (1917), and
Buell Y.:_ Duchesne Mercantile Company, 64 Utah 391, 231 P. !1'
(1924).
This rule of law as outlined in Snyder -v. Clune
~,.A.,.,__-

-·

is consistent with the overwhelming maj or~ty of_
in other jurisdictions.

t~c:.01:1rts

The Supreme Court of Arizona definec

"absence from the state" to mean "out of the state in the
sense that service of process in any of the methods authoriz1:
by rule or statute cannot be made upon the defendant to
secure personal jurisdiction by the trial court."

Selby~

Karman, 110 Ariz. 522, 521 P.2d 609, 611 (1974).
In Lipe Y.:_ Javelin Tire Company, Inc., 96 Ida.
723, 536 P.2d 291, 294-95 (1975), the court held that where
the defendant who was absent from the state could have been
located for service of process by reasonably diligent efforti
and the Idaho Court had continuing jurisdiction over the
absent defendant, the statute of limitations was not tolled
by reason of defendant's absence.
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,e:

s

For similar holdings, see Tarter~ INSCO, 550
P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976); Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224
(Wash. 1969);
(1973);

Kennedy~

McCullough~

Lynch, 84 N.M. 479, 513 P.2d 1261

Boyd, 475 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1970);

~

v. Vonsild, 541 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1975); and 55 A.L.R.3d 1158
and Supplement.
The basis of this rule is stated in 55 A.L.R.3d
1158, 1165:
" . . . [T]o toll the statute of limitations
during the absence or nonresidence of a party
who continues to be amenable to suit would allow
a plaintiff in such a situation to postpone
commencement of proceedings even though he has
the capacity to obtain jurisdiction, and would
therefore be ~nconsistent with the purpose of the
general statute of limitations, which is designed
to eliminate stale claims."
In the present case, Appellant was subject to the
jurisdiction of Utah's divorce court during the entire time
he was out of state.
II.

UTAH COURTS HAVE CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER

A PARTY TO A DIVORCE ACTION WHEN SAID PARTY LEAVES THE STATE.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, expressly
states that the court maintains continuing jurisdiction over

-7-
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the parties in matters relating to support.

This was clear-

ly pointed out in the case of Plumb ?...:._ Plumb, 555 P. 2d 1205.
1206 (Utah 1976) where the husband had served his ex-wife,
who was residing in South Dakota, with an Order to Show
Cause and the Court held "the parties were personally subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court under 30-3·i
U.C.A., 1953."
In the case of Brown?...:._ Vonsild,

541 P.2d 528 (ilev.

1975) the divorced wife brought an action for arrearages in
child support against the divorced husband who had been absem
from the state.

Said action was brought subsequent to the

statutory limitation period but the wife claimed that said
limitation period was tolled because of the defendant's
absence from the state.

The court held that since the

husband was continuously subject to service in the original
divorce proceedings, the statute which would have tolled the
limitation period because of defendant's absence, was inap·
plicable and the wife's claim was barred.
Utah's Long Arm statute also vests jurisdiction
over a party who has left the state, as it relates to
claims for support and maintenance.

Section 78-27-24, ~

Code Ann., 1953, as amended, states:
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"Any person . . . whether or not a citizen
or resident of this state . . . submits himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:

*

*

*

*

(6) with respect to actions of divorce and separate maintenance, the maintenance in this
state of a matrimonial domicile at the time
the claim arose or the commission in this state
of the act giving rise to the claim."
Utah's Long Arm statute further states in Section
78-27-28, "Subject to the applicable statute of limitations,
jurisdiction established under this act shall be exercised
regardless of when the claim arose."

(Emphasis added)

There would be an inherent inconsistency in the statutory
language if the court were to hold that the Long Arm statute,
giving jurisdiction over !!£!!.residents, is "subject to the
applicable statute of limitations," yet, the said statute of
limitations is tolled while the defendant is a !!£!!.resident.
There would never be a limitations.

Since this position is

absurd, it appears clear that the legislators did not intend
that defendant's absence from the state would toll the
statutory limitations when the Utah court has jurisdiction
by reason of the Long Arm statute.
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Respondent argued at the trial court that the
..... ~·· ·-

----~

domestic court did not have jurisdiction over the Appellant
while absent from the state, for the purpose of renewing a
judgment based upon child support.

-

In other words, once

child support becomes a judgment, the domes tic court

s~n.i~how

loses its right to renew that judgment.
By accepting Respondent's position, the trial
court significantly narrowed the domestic court's authority
I

and jurisdiction over nonresidents.

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code

Ann., 1953, and the cases cited by this Court which interpret
said language, are all very general and broad in terms of
granting jurisdiction by the Utah court over a nonresident
party.

The Long Arm statute cited above also has broad,

nonrestrictive language.

A judgment based upon support, is

still directly related to "support and maintenance", which
is the jurisdictional foundation of a domestic court, regard·
less of whether a party temporarily leaves the state.
This Court held in Seeley~ Park, 532 P.Zd 684
(1975), that "installments under a decree of divorce for
alimony or support of minor children become final judgmel!f1
as soon as they are due."

(Emphasis added)

If a support
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payment becomes a final judgment as soon as it is due, the
1970 judgment herein had to have been a renewal of previous
past due support payments (judgments) which had accrued
prior to said 1970 judgment.

Either the domestic court had

the power to renew judgments, or the 1970 judgment herein is
not a renewal and the limitation period would commence at
the time each support payment was due, and not at the time of
the 1970 judgment.

This would require a reversal of the

summary judgment granted herein since the trial court used
the 1970 judgment for the basis of its decision.
The domestic court has traditionally had broad
authority and jurisdiction concerning child support.

A

judge may find the defaulting party in contempt of court for
failing to pay past child support payments (which payments
are judgments,

Seeley~

Park, supra).

The law allows

special privileges to judgments based upon child support,
such as in the area of garnishment, execution, and homestead
rights.
In the case (such as the present case) where both
parties were residents at the time of the divorce, the
legislators have clearly stated their intention to allow
the court to maintain jurisdiction over said parties, even
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though one of the parties may subsequently move from the
county or state:
"The court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and necessary." Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann.,
1953.
(Emphasis added)
A child support payment, whether delinquent for a
day or for years, is still "support and maintenance" of the
children.

Just because a child support payment becomes

delinquent, thereby becoming a judgment, does not alter the
fact that said payment is for the support and maintenance of
said children.
The trial court below ruled that once a child suppo:payment becomes a judgment, the domestic court no longer
maintains jurisdiction over the nonresident party.

Such a

position would encourage delinquent fathers to intentionally
leave the state for the purpose of taking away the Utah court'·
jurisdiction to enforce child support payments.

This positio:.

would further mean that the court only has continuing juris·
diction over future support payments, and not past payments.
Clearly, such a position would be bad policy and against t~
legislative intent and prior judicial law.
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In the present case, Respondent could have com-

-------

menced this action at·--- any
time while Appellant
was absen~
···--· -- - - · - - - - - ·
..-·,..-llY,.: .. .....,- ...
~·

--'-~.,_

of the Long Arm statute.

~_,,_,_

~

~-·--·~"f_,,

Respondent could have effected

service of process whenever she desired, which is evidenced
by the fact that Respondent did serve an Order to Show Cause
upon Appellant while he was in

~orth

Carolina.

(R.31)

Respondent knew, or could have known, with little effort,
where the Appellant was located the entire time he was
absent from the state.

While in North Carolina, Appellant

was making child support payments to the Respondent with
checks that had his address printed thereon.
process could have

b~en

Service of

accomplished by any number of ways

as described in Rule 4(f)(l), (2), and (3), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, or Section 78-27-25, Utah Code Ann., 1953,
as amended, but, Respondent was derelict and failed to
corru:nence her action within the eight year statutory limitation
period.

Therefore, the Respondent's claim is barred and

should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

,/~~ay

of April, 1979.

CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN, KENNEDY &
POWELL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

_/_f::_

day of April,

1979, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert F. Orton, Esq., HANSEN
& ORTON, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent,

2020 Beneficial

Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll.
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